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THE ESTATE TAX NON-GAP: WHY 
REPEAL A “VOLUNTARY” TAX? 
Paul L. Caron* & James R. Repetti 




1 at that time was largely voluntary.2 Many academics still use the 
voluntary tax rhetoric even though Congress has closed many of the avoidance 
techniques that Cooper had identified.3 For example, Jeffrey Kinsler stated, 
“United States citizens are not required to pay estate and gift taxes! In fact, the 
only people who should pay such taxes are those wishing to donate money to 
the U.S. government.”4 Similarly, Edward McCaffery noted that “the system is 
so racked with exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions that hardly anyone ac-
tually pays any wealth transfer tax.”5 And J.D. Trout and Shahid Buttar pegged 
the effective estate tax rate at five percent in 1988, noting that “[u]ltimately, for 
political argument, if not scholarly publication, estate taxes can be considered 
‘voluntary.’”6
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 1.  In this article, we use “estate tax” as a shorthand way to refer to the three federal 
wealth transfer taxes: the estate tax, gift tax, and generation-skipping tax. 
 2.  George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax 
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977). 
 3.  See Daniel W. Matthews, A Fight to the Death: Slaying the Estate Tax Repeal 
Hydra, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 703 (2006) (“Repeal advocates often cite Cooper’s article 
for the proposition that the estate tax is voluntary.”). 
 4.  Jeffrey S. Kinsler, A Comparative Proposal to Reform the United States Gift Tax 
Annual Exclusion, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 951, 952 (1997). 
 5.  Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income Consumption Tax, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1215 (1992).  
 
 6.  J.D. Trout & Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance, Redi-
stributions, and the Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 818 (2000); see also Mitchell 
M. Gans & Jay S. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
759, 784 (2007) (“Currently, the valuation process saps the gift tax of its vitality and rele-
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Yet this conventional wisdom that the estate tax is easily avoided today 
flies in the face of the nearly twenty-year political struggle over its repeal. Why 
have so many politicians, think tanks, and lobbyists devoted so much time, 
money, and effort to repealing a voluntary tax? As one of this Article’s authors 
has previously noted: 
Criticisms of the estate tax have often been contradictory and confusing. On 
the one hand, critics have argued that the wealth transfer tax raises little reve-
nue, is easily avoided, and has no effect on concentrations of wealth. On the 
other hand, critics have argued that the transfer tax discourages savings and 
that payments of the estate tax financially burden family businesses. It is diffi-
cult to see how a tax that allegedly raises little revenue, is easily avoided, and 
has no effect on wealth concentration can at the same time impose a s ignifi-
cant burden on savings and businesses.7
                                                                                                                                       
gates it to a largely voluntary tax.”). 
 7.  James R. Repetti, The Case For the Estate Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493, 1493 (2000). 
 
This Article argues that the voluntary tax metaphor is a rhetorical device 
that crumbles under scrutiny. The unprecedented repeal efforts over the past 
twenty years belie the notion that the estate tax is easily avoided. Indeed, many 
of the techniques described by Cooper simply no longer provide significant es-
tate tax savings. The techniques that do work to lower the tax burden on an es-
tate often do so by reducing the actual economic value of assets transferred to 
heirs. This Article also asserts that the voluntary tax metaphor has infected 
analysis of estate tax empirical data. We argue that commentators confuse the 
concept of the effective estate tax rate in examining the efficacy of the estate 
tax. When one correctly considers the effective estate rate, one finds that the 
estate tax imposes a significant burden on even the largest estates. Lastly, we 
analyze attempts to calculate the alleged estate tax “gap”—the tax liability that 
is not paid voluntarily and timely as a percentage of all revenues that should 
have been lawfully paid. Although such calculations are always difficult be-
cause of the lack of reliable data, we show that there are additional reasons to 
doubt studies that have reported a large estate tax gap. The studies have ignored 
the personal liability imposed on e xecutors for unpaid estate taxes and the 
comparatively high estate tax audit rate. These factors suggest that the true es-
tate gap may be small, a view that is corroborated by the IRS’s audit results and 
one empirical study. We conclude that the estate tax is clearly not voluntary 
and is apparently more efficient than commonly thought in taxing transfers it 
was designed to reach. 
I. ESTATE TAX RHETORIC: WHY REPEAL A “VOLUNTARY” TAX? 
This Part briefly traces the history of the federal wealth transfer taxes and 
reviews the debate over whether the estate tax should be repealed. We conclude 
that rhetoric has replaced reason in this debate. 
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The federal estate tax was enacted in its current form in 1916 to raise reve-
nue during a time of war and to enhance the progressivity of the tax system.8 
Soon thereafter, the estate tax came to be seen as an important tool to curb con-
centrations of wealth.9 For over seventy years, a rough consensus endured 
around the necessity for the tax, with intermittent skirmishes over the appropri-
ate scope of the tax and its companion gift tax (enacted in its current form in 
1932)10 and generation-skipping tax (enacted in its current form in 1986).11
This estate tax consensus evaporated in the 1990s as disparate anti-tax ad-
vocates, initially from outside Washington, D.C. and later assisted by conserva-
tive think tanks and lobbyists, joined forces to turn large swaths of the public 
and Congress against the brilliantly re-cast “death tax.”
 
12 Although the tax af-
fects less than two percent of decedents who die each year, a substantial majori-
ty of the public came to oppose the tax.13
But the anti-estate tax forces did not achieve total victory. In 1999,
 
14 and 
2000,15 Congressional votes to repeal the estate tax were overridden by Presi-
dent Clinton’s veto. President Bush endorsed estate tax repeal efforts in the 
2000 campaign, and soon after assuming office in 2001 he signed tax legisla-
tion which increased the estate tax exemption amount and reduced rates 
through 2009,16 and then completely repealed estate and generation-skipping 
taxes (but not the gift tax) in 2010.17 Because of arcane Senate budget rules,18
                                                                                                                                       
 
 8.  Act of September 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756.  
 9.  See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and W ealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
825, 825 (2001). 
 10. The gift tax was originally enacted in 1924 (Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-
176, 43 Stat. 253), repealed in 1926 (Act of February 26, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 
9), and re-enacted in its current form in 1932 (Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 
Stat. 169). 
 11. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.  
 12. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT 
OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 13-14 (2005). 
 13. See, e.g., NAT’L PUB. RADIO ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON 
TAXES 15 (2003), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls (57% of respondents favored repeal of es-
tate tax). 
 14. Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 
1999). 
 15. Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000). 
 16. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, 115 Stat. 38. 
 17. The Act also replaced I.R.C. § 1014 (West 2009), which gives an heir who inhe-
rits property an income tax basis equal to the fair market value of the property at the date of 
the decedent’s death, with the new I.R.C. § 1022, which gives the heir an income tax basis 
equal to the decedent’s basis in the property. But this new carryover basis rule does not ap-
ply to the first $1.3 million of appreciated property held at the decedent’s death, or to the 
first $3 million of appreciated property passing to the decedent’s surviving spouse. 
 
 18. The Senate’s “Byrd Rule” requires a 60% majority to pass legislation that affects 
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the Act “sunsets” in 2011 and reinstates prior law, including the estate tax in 
effect in 2001. This budgetary sleight of hand allowed anti-tax forces to claim 
victory at having attained repeal (albeit for only one year) while mitigating the 
revenue loss by delaying the biggest increase in the exemption to 2009 and ab-
sorbing the full cost of repeal only for a single year (2010).19
Since the passage of the 2001 Act, annual congressional skirmishes over 
the estate tax have ensued between two camps: those who advocate complete 
repeal and those who wish to retain it in a revised form.
 
20 The House on several 
occasions has voted to make the estate tax repeal permanent,21 but the Senate 
has been unable to muster the sixty votes needed for passage.22
Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro examined how “such broad, diverse 
swaths of Congress and the voting public converge[d] to oppose a tax that only 
a tiny slice of the wealthiest Americans actually pay?”
 
23 Through a series of 
interviews of many of the participants they reveal the extent to which rhetoric 
has been shamelessly employed to promote repeal. Beginning in the early to 
mid-1990s, a loose coalition of anti-tax activists from outside Washington, 
D.C., with backing from eighteen wealthy families that contributed $500 mil-
lion,24
                                                                                                                                       
revenues beyond a ten-year period. Congressional Budget Act of 1974, § 3 13, 2 U .S.C. § 
644 (West 2009). See also ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BUDGET 
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” (RL 30862) ( 2008). 
 19. Budget rules permitted a total revenue loss of $1.35 trillion in 2001-2010, and full 
estate tax repeal effective immediately would have absorbed from 1/3 to 1/2 of the amount 
available for all tax cuts. See Richard L. Schmalbeck, Class War and the Estate Tax: Have 
the Troops Gone AWOL, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA 191 (Paul Carrington & Trina 
Jones eds., 2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: Through 
the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX REV. 187, 189 (2002) (footnotes omitted):  
Virtually no one expects to see the estate tax in its current form spring back into force in 
2011. Instead, the 2001 Act is best viewed as an unstable truce between two contending po-
litical camps: on one hand, the root-and-branch tax cutters who are determined to abolish the 
estate tax permanently, in several strokes if the goal cannot be achieved all at once; and on 
the other hand, skeptics who concede the need for estate tax reform but balk at outright re-
peal. Both camps have introduced bills staking out their respective positions, and the out-
come of the battle over the future of the estate tax remains uncertain. 
 21. See, e.g., Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act of 2002, H.R. 2143, 107th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2002); Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act of 2003, H.R. 8, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2003); Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act of 2005, H.R. 8, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) 
 22. See NONNA A. NOTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ESTATE TAX LEGISLATION IN THE 
110TH CONGRESS (RL 34374) (2008). 
 began efforts to recast public opinion against the estate tax. Among the 
eighteen families were the Blethen (Seattle Times), Cox (Cox Enterprises), 
Dorrance (Campbell Soup), Gallo (E&J Gallo Winery), Johnson (Black Enter-
tainment Television), Nordstrom (Nordstrom), and Walton (Wal-Mart) fami-
 23. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 253. 
 24. See SPENDING MILLIONS TO SAVE BILLIONS: THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SUPER 
WEALTHY TO KILL THE ESTATE TAX 1 (2006), http://www.citizen.org/documents/EstateTax- 
Final.pdf.  
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lies. Their success in mobilizing public sentiment against the estate tax was 
based in part on a series of studies from conservative think tanks purporting to 
show the deleterious effects of the estate tax.25 But a more important element 
was the use of “myriad stories of estate tax trauma,”26
A succession of stories about small business owners, farmers, and others 
were publicized to illustrate the allegedly pernicious effects of the estate tax on 
core American values of thrift, hard work, entrepreneurship, and family.
 to paint the “death tax” 
as an enemy of hard-working American families. 
27 
Graetz and Shapiro painstakingly point out the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, 
and often outright lies in these stories.28 Perhaps the most egregious example 
was the story of Chester Thigpen, an elderly grandchild of slaves whose Mis-
sissippi family tree farm was supposedly threatened by the estate tax but in fact 
was well under the threshold subject to the tax.29
But the accuracy of the stories did not matter—the prevailing ethos was 
that the stories could have been true, so they deserved to be retold. The stories 
succeeded in painting estate tax repeal as a moral issue. Estate tax defenders 
failed to offer an effective response
  
30—initially incredulous at the mere possi-
bility of estate tax repeal, they responded with ineffective dry, technical argu-
ments.31
                                                                                                                                       
 
 25. Graetz and Shapiro credit WILLIAM BEACH, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE CASE 
FOR REPEALING THE ESTATE TAX (1996), http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/- 
BG1091.cfm, as laying the intellectual foundation for the repeal effort and for spawning do-
zens of additional think tank research papers over the ensuing decade. See GRAETZ & 
SHAPIRO, supra note 
 The result was that “[a]bsent contrary moral arguments or compelling 
personal stories, their scientific rationality had little allure for the public or their 
12, at 15, 94, 242. 
 26. Richard J. Kaplan, Book Review, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 831, 832 (2005). 
 27. Graetz and Shapiro dub these “stories from the grasstops” as opposed to the “gras-
sroots.” GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 50. 
 28. Id. at 50-73.  
 29. Id. at 62-66. 
 30. Id. at 221-38 (Graetz and Shapiro nicely capture this ineffectiveness in the title of 
their chapter, “Stories Trump Science”). 
 31. Richard Kaplan asks, “[W]here were the counter-stories of spoiled brats inheriting 
outrageous sums and displaying no talent beyond self-indulgence? Curiously, Paris Hilton 
and her ilk never appeared as players in this drama.” Kaplan, supra note 26, at 834. Graetz 
and Shapiro noted that Ms. Hilton would serve as a potent symbol for the anti-repeal forces, 
and after the publication of the book she made frequent appearances in the public debate 
over estate tax repeal. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 234; see, e.g., Jack Beatty, Par-
is Hilton’s Party: The Repeal of the Estate Tax and the Dawn of the United States of Aristo-
cracy, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 29, 2005, available at http://www.theatlantic. 
com/doc/200504u/pp2005-04-29; E.J. Dionne, The Paris Hilton Tax Cut, WASH. POST, Apr. 
12, 2005, at A21; Editorial, Paris Hiltonomics: The Estate Tax Made Her What She Is To-
day, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2005, at A12; see also Reginald Mombrun, Let’s Protect Our 
Economy and Democracy from Paris Hilton: The Case for Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 61 (2007). 
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representatives in Washington.”32 Because their stories had succeeded in cap-
turing the moral high ground,33 the anti-tax advocates held out for full estate 
tax repeal and rejected offers of compromise to raise the exemption and lower 
the rates, even though most wealthy Americans (other than the super-rich) 
would have been better off with immediate reform rather than the future one-
year repeal ultimately adopted.34
Other commentators have also noted the increasing role of rhetoric in tax 
debates, which “seeks to persuade through bombast and confusion.”
 
35 Marjorie 
Kornhauser has criticized this trend, arguing that it undercuts democratic legi-
timacy.36
Part of the estate tax repeal rhetoric embraced the notion that the tax is vo-
luntary and easily avoided. Repeal proponents claim that the estate tax is volun-
tary by relying upon Cooper’s masterful, but dated, exegesis of estate planning 
devices employed in the middle of the twentieth century.
 Of course, the use of tax rhetoric divorced from reality did not origi-
nate in the estate tax repeal debate, but it may have reached its apogee there.  
II. THE ESTATE TAX NON-GAP 
37 For example, Bruce 
Bartlett, a senior analyst with the National Center for Policy Analysis 
(“NCPA”), relied on Cooper’s article in declaring that “careful estate planning 
can virtually eliminate the tax.”38
In this Part, we first refute estate tax opponents’ claims that simple estate 
planning techniques exist to easily circumvent the tax. We then examine effec-
tive estate tax rate calculations that show, contrary to the rhetoric, the tax ens-
nares even very large estates. Lastly, we analyze the widely disparate calcula-
tions of the estate tax “gap” and show that the low estimates of the gap are 
likely more accurate because commentators have ignored the personal liability 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 32. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 234; see also id. at 238 (“What is surprising 
. . . is how little the Democratic political leadership seems to understand the political power 
of storytelling so long after Ronald Reagan turned it into an art form. George W. Bush 
pushed his proposals with his ‘tax families’ at his side. Democrats seem to be living in John 
Dewey’s fantasy world where science alone will move people to political action.”).  
 33. One of us has explored the power of stories to both explain and shape the devel-
opment of the law. See TAX STORIES (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003). 
 34. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 214-17. 
 35. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Move-
ment: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 476 (1987). 
 36. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax 
Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819 (2002); Kornhauser, supra 
note 35; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 
70 TUL. L. REV. 2345 (1986); see also William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: 
The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287 (1996).  
 37. Cooper, supra note 2. 
 38. Bruce Bartlett, The End of the Estate Tax, 76 TAX NOTES 105, 106-07 (1997).  
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of executors for unpaid taxes and comparatively high estate tax audit rate.  
A. Estate Planning and the “Voluntary” Tax 
Arguments that the estate tax can be easily avoided based on Cooper’s ar-
ticle are misplaced. Some of the estate planning devices discussed by Cooper 
are no longer available because of statutory changes.39 For example, estate 
freezes that involve preferred stock recapitalizations can no longer transfer un-
taxed value to heirs by failing to make dividend payments on preferred stock 
held by the older generation.40 Unless the preferred stock pays dividends, it is 
assigned a zero value, which means that the older generation is treated as hav-
ing made a taxable transfer of all the value in the corporation. Similarly, quali-
fied pension plans are no longer excluded from a decedent’s gross estate.41
Planning with minority discounts will not create a risk of a real diminution 
in value, however, where the transfers are to a single person. For example, sup-
pose that A decides to give all the shares in her corporation to one donee by 
 
Other devices such as minority discounts are still available that may enable 
taxpayers to reduce the value of assets for estate tax purposes. But these devic-
es frequently entail a r isk of real economic diminution in the value of assets 
transferred to heirs. In one technique, decedents may place property into family 
limited partnerships and transfer limited partnership interests to family mem-
bers. Because such limited partnership interests do not usually permit participa-
tion in management, the value of the interest qualifies for a minority discount 
below the value of the underlying assets. The amount of the discount is calcu-
lated using a hypothetical buyer and seller dealing at arms-length. As a result, 
courts are not permitted to take into account the actual identity of the general 
partner who manages the family partnership. Thus, if the general partner is a 
relative of the limited partners and is solicitous of their interests, the court’s 
discount may be larger than reality would warrant. On the other hand, if the re-
lationship among the general partner and limited partners becomes acrimo-
nious, the discount may be smaller than the actual strained relationships would 
warrant. The result is that this is not a “sure fire” planning device. If the heirs 
holding partnership interests do not get along well, it is possible that the dis-
count may be justified and in fact understate the diminished value of the prop-
erty.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 39. For an excellent detailed examination of Cooper’s estate planning devices, see 
Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION 113 (William G. Gale, James R. Hines, Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds., 2001) [he-
reinafter RETHINKING ESTATES AND GIFT TAXATION]. 
 40. PAUL R. MCDANIEL, JAMES R. REPETTI & PAUL L. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAXATION 829-31 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MCDANIEL, REPETTI & CARON]. 
 41. Id. at 351-52. 
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transferring a portion of her shares each year for several years. Each transfer 
will qualify for a minority discount even though the donee will eventually hold 
a majority interest in the corporation at the time she is receiving the transfers.42
Other devices, various forms of split interest trusts, also are not risk-free 
ways to transfer hidden value to heirs. For example, charitable lead trusts, dis-
cussed extensively by Cooper,
 
Moreover, there is no risk of a real diminution of value of the shares since the 
donee will not share control with others. But there are some tax risks associated 
with this strategy. If A dies before she has transferred a majority interest in her 
corporation, the shares she retains will be valued with a control premium. 
Moreover, A will have given up control of her business while she is still alive, 
something that many taxpayers find psychologically very difficult to do. If she 
seeks to retain de facto control after she has transferred the stock, the full value 
of the stock at the date of her death will be included in her gross estate. 
43 can be used to transfer value free of tax, but 
the circumstances in which that may occur are largely outside a decedent’s con-
trol. A charitable lead trust involves the grantor transferring property in trust 
and then allocating the trust income interest to a charity and the trust remainder 
interest to an individual.44
If the charitable organization’s income interest is sufficiently high and is 
paid out for a sufficiently long period, the present value of the remainder inter-
est will be zero and, therefore, no transfer tax will be owed. For example, con-
sider a situation where 120% of the AFR used to value the interests in a charit-
able lead trust is 5.6%.
 The value of the remainder interest, which is a taxa-
ble gift by the grantor to the individual at the time the trust is established, is de-
termined by calculating the discounted present value of the interest paid to 
charity using a discount rate equal to 120% of interest rates (the “applicable 
federal rate” (“AFR”)) published by the IRS pursuant to section 7520 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.  
45
Some practitioners have described charitable lead trusts as “underused” es-
tate planning devices.
 Suppose that the taxpayer contributes assets valued at 
$1 million to a charitable lead trust that will pay 8.4375% of that amount to a 
charity every year for 20 years. In that case the remainder interest is assigned a 
value of zero, and no gift tax is due.  
46
                                                                                                                                       
 
 42. See, e.g., Internal Rev. Serv., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9432001 (Aug. 12, 1994). This 
technique is discussed in James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and 
Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REV. 415, 431-34 (1995).  
 We believe the reason for this underuse is that success 
in transferring untaxed wealth in a charitable lead trust is not certain. The re-
 43. Cooper, supra note 2, at 207-10. 
 44. See MCDANIEL, REPETTI & CARON, supra note 40, at 582. 
 45. This example is from Martyn S. Babitz & Lisa Susanto, Charitable Lead Trusts: A 
Useful, But Neglected, Planning Tool, 34 EST. PLAN. 21, 22 (2007). 
 46. Id. at 25. 
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mainder person will receive property when the trust terminates only if the asset 
generates income (or appreciates in value) at a rate greater than 120% of the 
AFR. In the example above, if the asset only generates 5.6%, the remainder 
person will receive zero. If instead the asset generates a 7% return, that indi-
vidual will receive $410,704. A return of 10% would leave $1,894,942 for the 
remainder person. 
The charitable lead trust, therefore, entails a significant risk that the tax-
payer will not pass any property to the remainder person.47
Other spit-interest trusts, which were commonly used prior to 1990, a lso 
permitted taxpayers to transfer value to heirs free of tax. Before the adoption of 
I.R.C. section 2702, taxpayers could make disguised transfers of wealth by re-
taining an income interest in property that they knew would not generate in-
come, but the retained income interest was valued as though it paid income at 
the AFR.
 The strategy works 
best when the AFR is low and taxpayer has assets that are likely to generate re-
turns in excess of the applicable federal rate. At the time of Cooper’s article, 
the interest rate used to value interests was arbitrarily fixed at 6%, which meant 
that value could be transferred to heirs untaxed so long as the asset generated a 
rate of return greater than 6%. During the 1980s, for example, when prevailing 
interest rates often exceeded 6%, the strategy was certain to transfer value to 
heirs. Currently, the AFR is adjusted every month in accordance with the inter-
est rates on various federal debt obligations. The monthly adjustments track 
general market conditions and make it less certain that the assets will be able to 
generate a return greater than the AFR. 
48 Section 2702 eliminated this technique by valuing the retained in-
terest at zero, unless income distributions are required regardless of whether the 
asset generates income.49 The only exception is for “Qualified Personal Resi-
dence Trusts” (“QPRTs”). Special rules permit the value of an interest retained 
by a taxpayer in her principal residence and one other residence to be deter-
mined as though it generated income if certain qualifications are met.50
The result of these and other legislative changes since the publication of 
 But 
even QPRTs fail to eliminate all tax risk. If the value of the home declines, 
some or all the gift tax exemption used on creation of the trust to avoid gift tax 
liability will have been wasted. Moreover, if the grantor dies during the period 
of her retained interest, the fair market value at the date of her death will be in-
cluded in her gross estate.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 47. See, e.g., CAROLYN M. OSTEEN & MARTIN HALL, A MANUAL ON THE TAX ASPECTS 
OF CHARITABLE GIVING 366 (2d ed. 2000) (“It is important not to lose sight of the fact that a 
zero remainder may not only reflect the IRS calculation but also what is actually transferred 
to the family at the end of the lead term.”). 
 48. MCDANIEL, REPETTI & CARON, supra note 40, at 834-38. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 838-39.  
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Cooper’s article is that taxpayers now can reduce the value of assets subject to 
transfer tax in many instances only if they are willing to assume the risk that 
the reduction may be economically real and reduce the actual value of assets 
transferred to heirs or, alternatively, in narrow situations if they are willing to 
incur some tax risk.  
B. Effective Estate Tax Rates and the “Voluntary” Tax 
The current rhetoric about the voluntary nature of the estate tax has not 
been confined to confusion about the effectiveness of estate planning devices. It 
also has been employed to obfuscate the data. We explain below how the calcu-
lation of the effective estate tax rate reflects the rhetoric surrounding the estate 
tax debate. 
In general, an effective tax rate is determined by dividing tax revenues by 
the tax base. The starting point for determining the estate tax base, the gross es-
tate, represents the value of most interests in property held by the decedent at 
death. Several items are then subtracted from the gross estate to calculate the 
taxable estate. These items include expenses incurred in administering the es-
tate, contributions to charities, and amounts left to the decedent’s surviving 
spouse.  
The reasons for such deductions vary. Because the estate tax seeks to tax 
items transferred by the decedent, Congress permits a deduction for the estate’s 
expenses so that the tax is assessed only on amounts actually transferred to 
heirs.51 Congress enacted deductions for charitable bequests to encourage con-
tributions to charity.52
Proponents of repeal, in trying to make the estate tax appear as though it is 
easily avoided, calculate the effective rate by using the gross estate, not the tax-
able estate, in the denominator. For example, to support his assertion that the 
estate tax is voluntary, Bruce Bartlett stated that tax revenue collected in 1985 
as a pe rcentage of gross estates was 17.6% for gross estates between $5-$20 
million, and 12.9% for estates over $20 million.
 The deduction for transfers to the surviving spouse (the 
marital deduction) reflects Congress’s view that spouses should be treated as a 
single taxpaying unit, with estate tax deferred until the death of the surviving 
spouse. Viewed as a whole, the deductions evidence an intent of Congress to 
tax net transfers to recipients other than charities and spouses. 
53
But Bartlett’s own calculations do not support his assertion that the tax 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 51. Id. at 515. 
 52. Id. at 558. For an excellent analysis of the role of a charitable deduction in the es-
tate tax, see Miranda Perry Fleicher, Charitable Contributions in an I deal Estate Tax, 60 
TAX L. REV. 263 (2007). 
 53. Bartlett, supra note 38, at 106-08.  
2009] THE ESTATE TAX NON-GAP 163 
 
may be eliminated through simple planning. Estates with gross estates in excess 
of $20 million still paid a significant tax in 1995 (12.9 % of their gross estates, 
according to Bartlett’s calculation). In addition, Bartlett’s calculations are mis-
leading because he ignores the deductions from the gross estate that are permit-
ted in calculating the taxable estate. He fails to mention that estates filing re-
turns in 1995 with more than $20 million in their gross estates reduced their 
estate tax liability by donating almost three times the percentage of their gross 
estates to charity than the smaller estates gave to charity: estates with $5-$10 
million and $10-$20 million donated, respectively, 8.2% and 8.3% of their as-
sets to charity, while gross estates in excess of $20 million contributed 22.1% 
of their assets to charity.54 In other words, large estates reduced their tax liabili-
ty in 1995 by reducing the real value of assets that would pass to their heirs. 
This is hardly a clever estate planning device designed to pass more assets to 
heirs, but rather is an activity consistent with congressional intent for allowing 
the charitable deduction.55
More recent data reflect a similar story. Set forth in Table 1 are the effec-
tive tax rates and charitable contributions for all estates reporting gross estates 
of $5 million or more from 2002 through 2006.
  
56
                                                                                                                                       
 
 54. According to data from the IRS, Internal Revenue Serv., SOI Tax Stats—Estate 
Tax Statistics, http://www.irs. gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96442,00.html#2, returns 
filed in 1995 for all gross estates with $5-$10 million assets reported $11,653,648,000 in as-
sets and contributed $955,692,000 to charity (8.2% of the aggregate gross estate). Gross es-
tates with $10-$20 million reported $7,844,740,000 in assets and contributed $652,453,000 
to charity (8.3% of the total gross estate). Gross estates over $20 million reported 




 55. Interestingly, there was little difference among the various size estates with re-
spect to amounts bequeathed to the surviving spouse that qualified for the marital deduction. 
Estates with gross estates of $5-$10 million, $10-$20 million, and over $20 m illion be-
queathed, respectively, 36.36%, 40.64%, and 39.15% of their gross estates to the surviving 
spouse. Authors’ calculations using data from IRS. Id. In general, we would expect larger 
gross estates to bequeath a greater percentage of the gross estate to the surviving spouse be-
cause the estate tax credit would shelter a p roportionately smaller percentage of the larger 
estates. See MCDANIEL, REPETTI & CARON, supra note 40, at 698-99. 
 56. Authors’ calculations using data from Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 54. As 
was the case with the 1995 da ta, see supra note 55, bequests to surviving spouses in the 
2002-2006 data did not vary greatly with the size of the gross estate. For example, in 2002, 
estates with gross estates of $5-$10 million, $10-$20 million, and over $20 m illion be-
queathed, respectively, 39.24%, 40.63%, and 40.38% of their gross estates to the surviving 
spouse. The year with the greatest variation was 2003, in which estates with gross estates of 
$5-$10 million, $10-$20 million, and over $20 million bequeathed, respectively, 36.56%, 
39.88%, and 45.93% of their gross estates to the surviving spouse. As we discussed in supra 
note 55, we would expect larger estates to bequeath a greater percentage of the gross estate 
to the surviving spouse because the estate tax credit shelters a proportionately smaller per-
centage of the larger estates. 




Year  Size of 
Gross Estate 
 
Effective Estate Tax 
Rate (Revenue as % 
of Gross Estate) 
Percent of Gross Estate 
Contributed to Charity 
2002 $5 to 10 million 16.64% 7.40% 
 $10 to 20 million 17.30% 9.40% 
 $20+ million 12.35% 22.30% 
2003 $5 – 10 million 16.69% 6.67% 
 $10 – 20 million 16.68% 8.92% 
 $20+ million 12.40% 15.24% 
2004 $5 – 10 million 16.76% 6.76% 
 $10 – 20 million 18.00% 8.12% 
 $20+ million 13.47% 17.62% 
2005 $5 – 10 million 15.99% 7.03% 
 $10 – 20 million 17.56% 8.51% 
 $20+ million 15.39% 24.30% 
2006 $5 – 10 million 15.23% 6.05% 
 $10 – 20 million 17.60% 7.80% 
 $20+ million 15.57% 17.83% 
 
For 2002-2006, estates in excess of $20 m illion generally had a slightly 
lower effective tax rate than smaller estates but also made much larger charita-
ble contributions. The large estates made charitable contributions that, calcu-
lated as a percentage of gross estates, ranged from two to almost three times the 
contributions made by smaller estates. These calculations suggest that dece-
dents with large estates are paying a lower effective tax rate because they are 
transferring a lower percentage of their assets to their heirs. In other words, 
large estates have a lower effective tax rate because, consistent with congres-
sional intent, they make very large charitable contributions. 
The failure to factor in charitable contributions raises a question about the 
use of effective tax rates to determine the efficacy of the estate tax. Bartlett and 
others calculate the effective rate by comparing revenues to the gross estate.57
                                                                                                                                       
 
 57. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES: 
ECONOMIC ISSUES (RL 30600) (2007) (calculating estate tax burden by comparing tax reve-
nue to net estate, defined as the gross estate less expenses). 
  
This approach in effect treats deductions allowed by Congress as part of the 
tax’s ineffectiveness. A better perspective on the efficacy of the estate tax in 
achieving its policy goals is to compare revenues to the taxable estate, which 
excludes transfers that Congress has expressly determined not to tax.  This ap-
proach suggests that large estates are generally paying a higher effective tax 
rate than smaller estates, after accounting for the deductions specifically autho-
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rized by Congress. For the 1995 data used by Bartlett, we calculate effective 
tax rates of 36.48%, 40.14%, and 39.84% for estates with gross estates of $5-
$10 million, $10-$20 million, and over $20 million, respectively. For the years 
2002 through 2006, the large estates in fact had a higher effective tax rate than 






Size of Gross Estate 
 
Effective Estate Tax Rate           
(Revenue as % of  
Taxable Estate) 
2002 $5 – 10 million 35.12% 
 $10 – 20 million 39.50% 
 $20+ million 39.91% 
2003 $5 – 10 million 32.99% 
 $10 – 20 million 36.95% 
 $20+ million 38.06% 
2004 $5 – 10 million 33.13% 
 $10 – 20 million 38.00% 
 $20+ million 39.95% 
2005 $5 – 10 million 31.76% 
 $10 – 20 million 38.84% 
 $20+ million 42.94% 
2006 $5 – 10 million 29.73% 
 $10 – 20 million 38.06% 
 $20+ million 43.99% 
 
Additional refinements are required for our calculations to capture accu-
rately the effective estate tax rate. As discussed earlier, a common estate plan-
ning technique that may allow estates to transfer value to their heirs at a r e-
duced tax rate is the minority discount.59 It is very difficult to calculate the 
extent to which minority discounts are claimed on t ransfer tax returns. Barry 
Johnson, Jacob Mikow, and Martha Britton Eller analyzed 1998 estate tax re-
turns and found that 6.3% of such returns claimed minority discounts, and that 
these discounts equaled 10.4% of the total assets reported on those returns.60
                                                                                                                                       
 
 58. Authors’ calculations using data from Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 
 
The amount of the discount varied for different assets. They found that, on av-
erage, discounts of 36.3% were claimed for interests in limited partnerships and 
54. 
 59. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 60. Barry W. Johnson, Jacob M. Mikow & Martha Britton Eller, Elements of Federal 
Estate Taxation, in RETHINKING ESTATES AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 39, at 65. 
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29.8% for closely-held stock.61
Because of the lack of data, our calculations of effective tax rates do not 
take minority discounts into account. But Johnson, Mikow and Eller’s conclu-
sion that returns claiming a minority discount deducted on average 10.4% of all 
their assets confirms that such discounts are not eliminating the estate tax. Al-
though it is possible that their estimates, which are dated, are lower than the 
amount of discounts currently claimed,
  
62
The same is true for the other devices for reducing value, split interest 
trusts, described above.
 discounts that are even twice as large 
would not eliminate the estate tax. Moreover, as noted earlier, some of the mi-
nority discounts may in fact be legitimate—that is, they may reflect a real de-
cline in economic value transferred to heirs because of the shared control.  
63
The current rhetoric about a voluntary estate tax has also affected the cal-
culation of the estate tax “gap”—the tax liability that is not paid voluntarily and 
timely as a percentage of all revenues that should have been lawfully paid. Stu-
dies of the tax gap have varied significantly. A 1996 study by Edward N. Wolff 
reported a 76.8% estate tax gap.
 Data is not available showing the amount of transfer 
taxes avoided with the use of QPRTs, but in 2006, the largest estates (gross es-
tates in excess of $20 million) reported personal residences with a total value of 
$1.45 billion, equaling 2.6% of the gross estate. Once again, the data belie the 
rhetorical claim that the estate tax is being eliminated for large estates.  
C. The Estate Tax Gap and the “Voluntary” Tax 
64 His study estimated the amount of revenues 
that should have been collected by analyzing the 1992 S urvey of Consumer 
Finance. In contrast, a 1997 study by James Poterba, using data from the 1995 
Survey of Consumer Finance, estimates the tax gap to be less than 10%.65
                                                                                                                                       
 
 61. Id. A subsequent study that analyzed estate tax returns filed in 2000 also found 
that, on average, 30% discounts were claimed for closely held stock and 33% for limited 
partnership interests. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF THE ESTATE TAX ON FARMS AND 
SMALL BUSINESSES 13 tbl.7 (2005). 
 62. But see Ted D. Englebrecht, Mary M. Anderson & Otto Martinson, An Empirical 
Investigation of the Minority Interest and Marketability Discounts in Valuation of Closely 
Held Stock for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 22 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 89, 100-01 (2006) (re-
porting declining mean and median minority discounts applied by Tax Court to closely held 
stock in cases decided in three successive ten-year periods as, respectively, 21% and 17% in 
1973-1982; 21% and 25% in 1983-1992; and 15% and 19% in 1993-2002). 
 A 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50. 
 64. Edward N. Wolff, Commentary: The Uneasy Case for Abolishing the Estate Tax, 
51 TAX L. REV. 517, 521 (1996). He estimated that tax collections in 1993 should have been 
$44.5 billion , while only $10.3 billion had been collected. Id. 
 65. James Porteba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns 17 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3667, 1997). 
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subsequent study by Martha Britton Eller, Brian Erard, and Chih-Chin Ho re-
ports that the significant variance between the Wolff and Poterba studies is at-
tributable to assumptions about when individuals in the different data sets will 
die and how much of their wealth will be left as bequests to their spouses that 
qualify for the marital deduction.66 They also report that an unpublished paper 
by Brian Erard, using data from completed IRS audits of 1992 estate tax re-
turns, found the gap to be only 13%.67
Eller, Erard and Ho argue that the 13% estate tax gap figure is low because 
it is based on tax revenues collected in settlement of the audits and, therefore, 
may not represent the full amount that should have been collected. (Apparently, 
they have little faith in the ability of the adversarial audit process to ascertain 
the correct liability.) Moreover, they assert that the audits could not capture tax 
revenues that escaped detection in the audit process.
  
68 They also contend that 
estate tax compliance is more problematic than income tax compliance because 
“a substantial portion of the income tax is subject to information reporting, 
withholding and document matching, [while] relatively little of the estate tax 
base is covered by these forms of independent verification.”69
The most recent IRS and Treasury estimate of the tax gap is $345 billion 
for the 2001 tax year.
 
70 Of this amount, $8.1 billion is attributed to the estate 
tax—2.4% of the total tax gap.71
                                                                                                                                       
 
 66. Martha Britton Eller, Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Noncompliance with the Fed-
eral Estate Tax, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 
 The $8.1 billion estate tax gap translates into a 
22.9% non-compliance rate for the estate tax, which is slightly larger than the 
noncompliance rate of the individual (20.9%) and corporate (18.5%) income 
taxes. The IRS classifies the certainty of its tax gap estimates in three catego-
ries—“actual amounts,” “reasonable estimates,” and “weaker estimates,” and 
places its estate tax gap estimate in the “weaker estimate” category. The IRS 
does not explain its calculation of the estate tax gap or the reasons for its low 
confidence level in its estimate. 
39, at 380.  
 67. Id. at 385 (reporting results in Brian Erard, Estate Tax Underreporting Gap Study: 
A Report Prepared for the Internal Revenue Service Economic Analysis and Modeling 
Group, Order No. TIRNO-98-P-00406 (1999)). 
   68. Id. 
   69. Id. at 376. 
 70. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX 
GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 8 (2007); JAMES M. BICKLEY, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT (RL 33882) (2007); Internal Rev-
enue Serv., The Tax Gap, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,id=158619,00.html; see 
also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR 
REDUCING THE TAX GAP (2006); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: MULTIPLE 
STRATEGIES, BETTER COMPLIANCE DATA, AND LONG-TERM GOALS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE 
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE (GAO 06-208T, 2005). 
 71. The breakdown of the $8.1 billion in estate tax noncompliance is $2 billion nonfil-
ing, $4 billion underreporting, and $2.1 billion underpayment.  
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What should one make of the wildly disparate estate tax gap estimates—
76.8%, 22.9%, 13%, and 10%? We believe that the lower estate tax gap esti-
mates may be justified for two reasons. 
First, prior commentators on the estate tax gap may not have considered 
that the structure of the estate tax itself operates as a significant check on non-
compliance. High estate tax thresholds and the personal liability of the estate’s 
executor for unpaid taxes provide barriers to estate tax noncompliance that are 
not present in income tax noncompliance.72
Second, the disincentive to cheat on an estate tax return is especially strong 
given the comparatively high estate audit rate. In 1992, the IRS audited 19.2% 
of all estate tax returns,
 An executor who hides value from, 
or claims excessive deductions on, an estate tax return and then distributes the 
estate’s assets to heirs is personally liable for the estate’s tax deficiencies. Con-
sequently, there is a powerful disincentive to cheat unless the executor is the 
sole heir. If there are heirs in addition to the executor, she will incur potential 
liability for a benefit that she has not received.  
73 compared to only 1.06% of all income tax returns.74 
The audit rate was even higher for larger estates: 26.5% for $1-$5 million es-
tates and 48.6% for estates over $5 million.75 The overall estate tax audit rate 
for 2006 has decreased to 7.7% of all estate tax returns, and was 19.9% for es-
tates over $5 million,76 due in part to reduced IRS staffing in the estate tax 
area.77 In comparison, the overall income tax audit rate for returns filed in 2006 
was 1.0%, and the audit rate was 2.0% for individuals with over $200,000 in 
income and 9.3% for individuals with over $1 million in income.78
                                                                                                                                       
 
 72. 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2006) (imposing personal liability on the estate’s executor for 
unpaid taxes due to the federal government); MCDANIEL, REPETTI & CARON, supra note 
 
Given the high estate tax audit rates and the incentive for executors to be 
truthful where they are not the sole heir, we believe the lower estate tax gap es-
timates may be closer to the mark.  
40, 
at 865-71.  
 73. Martha Britton Eller, Audit Revaluation of Federal Estate Tax Returns, 1992, 20 
STAT. INCOME BULL. 100, 101 (2000).  
   74. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IRS AUDIT RATES BY 
INDIVIDUAL AUDIT CLASS: NONBUSINESS AND BUSINESS RETURNS, FYS 1988 THROUGH 2001 
(2002), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/national/ratesTab3.html.  
   75. Eller, supra note 73, at 101. 
   76. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, DATA BOOK 2007, at 23 tbl. 9 
(2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07databk.pdf. 
   77. See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. to Cut Auditors, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at B1 
(“The federal government is moving to eliminate the jobs of nearly half of the lawyers at the 
Internal Revenue Service who audit tax returns of some of the wealthiest Americans, specifi-
cally those who are subject to gift and estate taxes when they transfer parts of their fortunes 
to their children and others.”). 
   78.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 76, at 23 tbl.9. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the accuracy of George Cooper’s characterization thirty years ago, 
the evidence shows that the estate tax is clearly not voluntary today, unless one 
wishes to actually reduce the real value of assets transferred to heirs. Regard-
less of the methodology used to measure the effective estate tax rate, the estate 
tax imposes a significant burden on even the largest estates. Moreover, the low-
er range of estimates of the estate tax gap may be more accurate than higher es-
timates because of the personal liability of executors for estate tax deficiencies 
and the relatively high estate tax audit rate. 
Only when we have an accurate view of the role that the estate tax current-
ly plays can we make sensible decisions in charting its future. The incorrect no-
tion that the estate tax is voluntary should not cloud analysis about its future.  
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